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Abstract 
Economists and economic historians want to know how much better life is today than in the past. 
Fifty years ago economic historians found surprisingly small gains from 19th century US railroads, 
while more recently economists have found relatively large gains from electricity, computers and cell 
phones. In each case the implicit or explicit assumption is that researchers were measuring the value 
of a new good to society. In this paper we use the same techniques to find the value to society of 
making existing goods cheaper. Henry Ford did not invent the car, and the inventors of mechanised 
cotton spinning in the industrial revolution invented no new product. But both made existing products 
dramatically cheaper, bringing them into the reach of many more consumers. That in turn has 
potentially large welfare effects. We find that the consumer surplus of Henry Ford’s production line 
was around 2% by 1923, 15 years after Ford began to implement the moving assembly line, while the 
mechanisation of cotton spinning was worth around 6% by 1820, 34 years after its initial invention. 
Both are large: of the same order of magnitude as consumer expenditure on these items, and as large 
or larger than the value of the internet to consumers. On the social savings measure traditionally used 
by economic historians, these process innovations were worth 15% and 18% respectively, making 
them more important than railroads. Our results remind us that process innovations can be at least as 
important for welfare and productivity as the invention of new products. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
How much better is life today than in the past? And how much better have production 
technologies become? These questions are intimately connected, and central to economics 
and economic history. Economic historians pioneered the social savings methodology, which 
found surprisingly modest gains from 19
th century US railroads, primarily because alternative 
production techniques were relatively effective (Fogel 1964, Fishlow 1965). Economists have 
found relatively large welfare gains to consumers, as measured by the rise in consumer 
surplus, from goods as diverse as electricity, computers, cell phones, Apple-Cinnamon 
Cheerio cereal, the internet, and sugar and tea.  
Studies of consumer surplus and social savings typically assume that utility-
maximizing consumers will rapidly adopt new goods after invention. In this paper, we try to 
open the ‘black box’ of the interactions between price decline and adoption. In many cases, 
“new” goods were already available, but not widely consumed because of price. Rose sugar, 
for example, was found at the court of Henry II (1154-89), but it is only with the arrival of 
sugar derived from sugar cane from the 17
th  century onwards that adoption became 
widespread. Motor cars were in use before Henry Ford introduced assembly-line production, 
but were limited to the affluent. In this paper, we investigate the extent to which social 
savings and consumer surplus are driven not by product inventions – like the railway or the 
cell phone  –  but by process innovations that made these goods cheap enough for mass 
consumption.  
We focus on two process innovations that rank amongst the most important advances 
in manufacturing techniques during the last 200 years – mechanical cotton spinning and the 
motor car assembly line. Both led to sensational price declines and both transformed what 
had been luxury items for upper class consumption – Indian calicoes and motor cars for the 
rich and famous – into items of everyday consumption for a significant part of the population. 
Workers on Ford’s Model-T assembly line could afford the cars they made; cotton spinners 
would wear cotton shirts. 
Process innovations create consumer surplus not through the availability of  a new 
good, but by making existing ones cheaper. The key difficulty in estimating consumer surplus 
with new goods is the value of the first units available. These tend to be hard to measure in 
quantity and difficult to assess in value. With process innovations, the good produced is 




the gain to society would be equal to the rise in profits. Not so if the price declines: in this 
case, consumers receive a windfall.  
Our paper is related to the literature on the value of new goods and increasing variety. 
Hausman (1996, cf Bresnahan , 1997) found that the introduction of Apple-Cinnamon 
Cheerios raised consumer welfare in the US by 0.002% of 1992 consumer expenditure. Other 
scholars have investigated gains from online booksellers (Brynjolfsson et al. 2003), the 
internet (Goolsbee and Klenow 2006), the introduction of the minivan (Petrin 2002), and 
satellite TV (Goolsbee and Petrin 2004). Broda and Weinstein (2006), using a method 
pioneered by Feenstra (1994), argued that international trade had increased US consumer 
welfare substantially by increasing the range of goods available. Papers in the tradition of 
Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) use data at the household level, and are almost impossible 
to replicate with historical data. Greenwood and Kopecky (2010) have recently used a 
modified model of consumer demand to calculate the gains from the introduction of personal 
computers. They estimate gains of up to 4% of consumption expenditure.  
Our work also connects with research on efficiency gains from product innovation in 
historical perspective. The pioneering work was by Fogel (1964) and Fishlow (1965) with 
critiques from Davis (1966), Lebergott (1966) David (1969) and others. Research using the 
same methods for other countries only partly confirmed their conclusions (Hawke 1970, 
Herranz-Locan 2006, Summerhill 2005, Huenemann 1983). Recently, Leunig (2006) showed 
that the railway’s time savings were substantial. Work on the history of cotton spinning has 
focused strongly on the appropriateness of technology choice (in particular, the adoption of 
mule  vs.  ring spinning  -  Sandberg 1969, Lazonick 1981, Saxonhouse and Wright 1984, 
Leunig 2001, Ciliberto 2010.) Research on the assembly line has examined the importance of 
complementary managerial skills and organizational capacity (Chandler 1990), and the 
challenges of adapting the system to changing demand and taste heterogeneity (Wilson and 
McKinlay 2010). More recently, historians of technology have argued that the introduction of 
all-steel bodies may have been as important for economies of scale (Nieuwenhuis and Peter 
2007).  
We proceed as follows. The next section discusses the historical context and 
background. We then discuss and implement methods for assessing welfare gains and 







2.  Historical background and data 
 
In this section, we briefly summarize the rise of assembly line production, as pioneered by 
Henry Ford, and the development of mechanized cotton spinning in the Industrial Revolution. 
 
2.1 Henry Ford’s production line 
 
Henry Ford is an icon of twentieth century business. His most famous car, the Model-T, is 
best remembered for his quip that “Any customer can have a car painted any colour he wants 
so long as it is black” (Ford and Crowther, 1922, p. 72). Black was chosen because it dried 
faster. Speed mattered because the Model-T’s success was not that it was a particularly good 
car – it wasn’t – but because it was remarkably cheap. That in turn came from it being mass 
produced: it was built on a moving assembly line using interchangeable parts. In Cannery 
Row, John Steinbeck pointed out the importance of standardized components: “There was 
one nice thing about Model-T’s. The parts were not only interchangeable, they were 
unidentifiable.” (1990 Mandarin edition, p. 62). He had just stolen a Model-T carburettor to 
replace a broken one in a car he had borrowed. The phrase “mass production” was first used 
in an article that appeared in the entry on Henry Ford in the 1925 Encyclopaedia Britannica. 
(Lewchuk ‘Mass production’, in Mokyr Encyclopaedia, vol 3, p. 466)   
The concept of a moving assembly line was not new. Oliver Evans, for example, used 
assembly lines to produce flour as early as the late eighteenth century, while the Cincinnati 
slaughter houses used a moving production line in the 1870s (Hounshell, pp. 242-3). But 
Ford’s production line was far and away the most complex production line in existence. In all 
probability, Ford’s staff, not Ford himself, were responsible for the breakthrough, but Ford at 
least deserves credit for allowing them to experiment and innovate, and for backing their 
ideas. The story is well-told in Hounshell’s From the American System to Mass Production, 
1800-1932. 
The effects were impressive: the time taken to assemble a Ford chassis fell from just 
under 12.5 hours in spring 1913 to 93 minutes a year later (Hounshell, pp. 254-5). Greater 
efficiency led to big falls in price: the Model-T cost $950 in 1909, and $360 in 1916, a fall in 
real terms of more than two-thirds (Hounshell, p. 224), which in turn enlarged the market. 
That was Ford’s aim – “I will build a car for the great multitude. It will be large enough for 




the best materials, by the best men to be hired, after the simplest designs that modern 
engineering can devise. But it will be so low in price that no man making a good salary will 
be unable to own one – and enjoy with his family the blessing of hours of pleasure in God's 
great open spaces.” (Ford and Crowther, 1922, p. 73) Between 1908 and 1927 Ford sold a 
total of 15 million Model-Ts, a production run that would not be surpassed until the Beetle in 
the 1970s, and by the outbreak of war more than half the cars in the United States were Fords. 
The “Tin Lizzie” became so popular that Steinbeck wrote that “Most of the babies of the 
period were conceived in Model-T Fords and not a few were born in them.” (Cannery Row 
pp. 55-6)  
Ford’s production line was gradually copied by his rivals, transforming the industry. 
The average price of a car sold in the US fell dramatically, from $2,126 in 1908 – the year in 
which the Model-T was introduced – to $642 in 1915, or $588 in real terms. Prices continued 
to fall in real terms, reaching $317 in 1923, at which point the price had declined by 85% in 
real terms (HSC series Df345/Df344). The number of cars sold in the US rose from 64,000 in 
1908 to 3.6 million in 1923 (Df344). By 1923 automobile sales represented 2.6% of GDP. (A 
full set of price and quantity data are given in the appendix). Ford’s invention of the moving 
assembly line, or at very least the application of the moving assembly line to the production 
of motor cars by the Ford Motor Company clearly had big welfare effects, yet economic 
historians have never sought to place a value on this. 
 
2.2 Cotton spinning 
 
Hobsbawm famously remarked, “Whoever says Industrial Revolution says cotton”. The 
British cotton industry stood at the heart of Britain’s transformation from an agricultural 
nation to an industrial one. From almost nothing in the mid-eighteenth century, cotton 
became Britain’s leading industry by 1815, a position it retained until the end of the century 
(Sandberg, 1981, p. 114). At its peak it was to employ half a million people directly, and at 
least the same again indirectly. The effect on consumers was also profound. As the great 
English political historian, A.J.P. Taylor – himself from a cotton merchant family – remarked 
“Every piece of cotton cloth is going to make someone warmer of cleaner or more 
comfortable” (1976). 
Britain had no natural advantage in the cotton industry: cotton does  not grow in 
Britain, with wool and flax being the locally produced fibres. But cotton is a good for 




fibre, the cotton production was much easier to mechanise than wool production. The 
spinning jenny and flying shuttle, the mule and power loom, the ring and automatic loom are 
known to generations of students. Of these, the first to have major economic significance was 
Crompton’s 1779 mule. The first mules were relatively primitive, and in was only in 1790 
that power, first animal, later water and steam were applied, and only with the invention of 
the “self-acting” mule in 1825 that it become the dominant form of spinning. Blaug (1961) 
argued that the period 1834-60 saw the introduction of a series of labour-saving refinements, 
and gradually, extra spindles were added to each mule allowing labour productivity to rise 
from 0.4 pounds per spinner per hour in 1830 to 2.3 in 1892. Although Cliometricians have 
studied the mule extensively, n o-one has valued the welfare gains from the fall in price of 
cotton goods. 
Mitchell gives the quantity of cotton processed in Britain. Prior to 1811 the figures do 
not adjust for changes in stocks, and so are best seen as  accurate taking one year with the 
next, but not necessarily for any given year. After 1811 the figures include changes in stocks. 
We know the price of yarn thanks to the painstaking archival work of Harley (1998). Here we 
concentrate on the price of medium yarn (40s), a nd in order to abstract from any 
improvements in cotton growing, or transatlantic shipping, which would affect the cost of 
raw cotton and so in turn yarn prices, we subtract the price of raw cotton from the price of 
yarn. The price of “Bowed Georgia” cotton is given in Mitchell for 1793 onwards (p. 759), 
which we project backwards using data for Philadelphia (Bezanson et al). Although the price 
level would have been different in Philadelphia and Liverpool, the changes in prices would 
have closely matched, g iven that shippers could send cotton freely to either place. Both 
Mitchell and Bezanson et al give maximum and minimum prices. We use the minimum 
prices, because the maximum price may have been a short-lived spike, and was often higher 
than the average value of the yarn that it could have produced at that time. Cotton can be 
stored, so no-one would have been forced to purchase large amounts of cotton at temporarily 
high prices. 
Given that cotton firms were well-known for using all of the raw cotton, we simply 
subtract the cost of a pound of raw cotton from the selling price of a pound of yarn to find the 
cost of manufacturing a pound of cotton yarn. That fell from 107d/lb in 1784 to 47d/lb within 
a decade, to 21d/lb by 1810 and to a low of just over 10d/lb by 1819, all in 1784 real terms. 
This 90% fall in the cost of manufacturing yarn clearly had important welfare implications. 
Interestingly, the total revenue did not rise dramatically, with values of between £5.0m and 




years. As a result the value of cotton processing fell rather than rose as a share of GDP over 
time. Notice that these figures include cotton yarn that would later be exported, either directly 
as yarn, or having been made into thread. 
 
 
3.  Methods and Results 
 
In this section we list, explain and apply various methods of assessing the value of the two 
process innovations outlined above. When we look at mass production of cars, we define 
1908 as the pre-mass production reference point (the Model-T was introduced only at the end 
of 1908, and sold in limited numbers initially), and 1923 as the end point. This is the year in 
which the price of the Model-T was lowest in real terms. In the case of cotton, we define 
1784 as the pre-improvement year and take 1820 as the end point. Clearly further 
improvements occurred after this, but this date is a reasonably approximation for the end of 
the initial improvements to the mule spindle. 
 
3.1 Social Savings 
 
The first formal oral exposition of the social savings concept was given by Fogel at the 1960 
Purdue Cliometrics meeting, and first appeared in print in his 1962 Journal of Economic 
History article. With the benefit of hindsight that article does not explain the concept well, as 
Fogel admitted in his 1978 EHA Presidential Address (Fogel, 1979, p. 3). There he was much 
clearer: “I defined the social saving of railroads in any given year as the difference between 
the actual cost of shipping goods in that year and the alternative cost of shipping exactly the 
same bundle of goods between exactly the same points without the railroad” (Fogel 1979, pp. 
2-3). The concept is simple: social savings are the fall in the cost of doing exactly what was 
done with a new technology, without it. Algebraically, therefore: 
SS = (P1 – P0).Q1                  (1) 
Where P0 and P1 are the pre- and post- technological improvement prices, and Q1 the quantity 
consumed at price P1.  
Clearly the comparison can never be perfectly like for like: without the railways 
goods and people cannot travel as quickly, for example. Foreman-Peck (1991) showed that 




conditions. Social savings records the fall in inputs required to produce a certain level of 
output when technology improves while TFP studies record the rise in output that an 
improvement in technology makes possible from a certain level of inputs. Analytically these 
are identical.  
We turn now to estimating the social savings from improvements in car assembly and 
cotton spinning. All we need to know to assess the social savings are the prices before and 
after, and the final level of consumption. We know that the cost of the average car sold 
declined in the United States between 1908 and 1923 from $2,126 to $317, in 1908 dollars, 
and that 3.6m cars were sold in 1923. It follows arithmetically that the social saving from the 
application of the production line to automobiles between 1908 and 1923 is therefore $(2126-
317) x 3.6m. This is $6.6bn in 1908 terms, or $12.6bn in 1923 terms. That in turn represents a 
staggering 14.7% of GDP. This is a quite remarkable result: automobiles valued at 2.6% of 
GDP created social savings of 14.7% of GDP. The power of a process innovation to improve 
the productivity of American industry appears to be truly remarkable.  
The cost of producing cotton fell from 107.2d/lb in 1784 to 12.6d/lb in 1820 in 1784 
pence. By 1820 Britain was producing 120m lbs of cotton. It follows, therefore, that the 
social savings of improvements in cotton processing were £47m in 1784 terms, or £64m in 
1820 terms. This is equivalent to 17.6% of GDP. The benefit to British consumers was equal 
to 7.5% of GDP, with the remainder accruing to those who bought Britain’s cotton exports. 
Many of the critiques levied at Fogel and Fishlow do not apply here. It is not the case 
that the previous technology was not scalable – with enough labour, 3.6m cars could have 
been produced in 1923 using 1908 production methods, for example. It i s doubtful that the 
long run cost curve for that technology sloped either up or down to any significant extent. 
Pre-mass production and post-mass production techniques for both car assembly and cotton 
production are much closer substitutes than canals and railways, for example. 
  The social savings estimates for these process innovations are very large indeed, and 
suggest that process innovations should be seen as just as important as product innovations to 
those who wish to understand the rise in material living standards over time. Nevertheless, 
the sheer scale of the result should give us pause for thought: we need to ask ourselves 
whether social savings estimates 5 or 7 times the market value of the products are plausible 
estimates of the benefits of the technology used to produce them. There is, of course, no a 
priori reason why the social saving cannot exceed the cost of production many times over. 




or as much cotton. To claim, for example, that every person who bought a car for $317 in 
1923 made a welfare gain of $1809 is not supported by revealed preference.  
 
3.2 Consumer surplus 
 
Simple approximation  
 
We know that the social savings methodology is an absolute upper bound on the welfare gain 
to consumers, correctly defined as the increase in the area under the demand curve. There are 
many ways to assess this area, all with different data requirements. The connection between 
consumer welfare and social savings is portrayed effectively by Crafts in figure 1 of his 2004 
paper on social savings. This is reproduced (and relabelled) below as figure 1. In this 
diagram, P0, Q0 and P1, Q1 represents the pre- and post- technology improvement price and 
quantity equilibria respectively.  Social savings is defined as (P0 – P1).Q1 and therefore equals 
the areas a + b + c + d + e in figure 1. 
Crafts notes that connecting the initial and final equilibria creates the line “D” in 
figure 1. Insofar as the demand for the good at any given price level is identical before and 
after the invention of the new technology these two points lie on a single demand curve 
(which is shown as being a straight line for simplicity – with only two observations it could 
clearly  take any functional form provided that it passes through the initial and final 
equilibria). In that case the rise in consumer surplus equals areas a + b + c, and the social 
savings methodology overestimates this by the amount d + e. If, therefore, in addition to 
knowing the initial and final prices, and final consumption level, we also know the initial 
consumption level, we are able to calculate the consumer surplus as defined in figure 1 as a + 
b + c. It is defined algebraically as (P0 – P1).(Q0 + Q1)/2.  
  We know that 64,000 cars were sold in the United States in 1908. It follows 
arithmetically that area a + b + c is equal to $3.3bn (in 1908 terms), $6.4bn in 1923 terms, 
and 7.5% of GDP. This is still a large number, but it is only a fraction over half the original 
social savings estimate.  
The case of cotton is not quite so straightforward, since some of the cotton produced 





1 For that reason we restrict ourselves here to cotton yarn produced and consumed in 
Britain. We have good quantity data for the proportion of cotton goods that were exported 
from 1800 onwards, and good value data prior to this date (Edwards, p. 243). It is therefore 
straightforward to estimate that Britain processed and retained 9.9 m lbs of cotton in 1784 
and 51.3 m lbs in 1820. Taken with the 1784 and 1820 costs of processing cotton given 
earlier, this implies that the consumer surplus, as measured by a + b + c is equal to £12.1m in 
1784 terms, or 4.5% of GDP. As with the case of cars, this is considerably smaller than the 
7.5% of GDP estimated by the social savings methodology. The difference in this case is a 
little less marked, because the initial level of consumption was higher. By inspection of figure 
1, we can see that when area a is larger relative to b + c + d + e, the difference between the 
consumer surplus and social savings estimates is smaller. In the limit, if demand does not rise 
when the cost falls (b + c + d +e = 0), consumer surplus and social savings will be equivalent, 
whereas if demand was zero prior to costs falling (a=0), then consumer surplus (as measured 
by schedule D and assuming linearity) will be half the value of social savings. The Ford 
example is close to the second limit case. 
 
Taking into account the change in demand 
 
Insofar as demand rises in the period in which the new technology is invented and adopted, 
then the initial and final equilibria do not lie on the same demand schedule, and the line 
marked D should not be seen as a valid demand curve. Crafts labels these as D 0 and D 1, 
representing demand before and after the invention of the new technology. Final demand will 
be higher by the rise in income multiplied by the income elasticity of demand, and by the rise 
in population. Insofar as we have only one observation for each demand curve, we cannot say 
much about the shape of D 0 and D 1, save only that the price elasticity of demand must be 
lower than for schedule D. The consumer welfare estimate of the benefit of  the new 
technology is given by the area under the D1 schedule, that is, by areas a + b + c + d.  
In order to estimate the consumer surplus under D 1, we need to be able to estimate 
consumption when price is P0. Here we proxy this by the actual consumption multiplied by 
                                                                 
1 In his 1999 response to Cuenca Estaban, Harley presents estimates of the linear approximation to consumer 
surplus from the development of the cotton industry 1770-1841, termed here a + b + c. However, he defines 
consumer surplus incorrectly. In the case of linear demand, he defines it as the area vertically below the 
demand curve between the pre- and post- innovation quantities, rather than the area horizontally to the left 
of the demand curve between the pre- and post- innovation prices. This leads him to overestimate the linear 




the rise in GDP, that is, we are assuming a linear relationship between income and 
consumption of cotton and cars. Insofar as much of the rise in income comes about from the 
rise in population this assumption is likely to be reasonably accurate. This is particularly true 
for cotton, where 85% of the rise in GDP occurred because of population growth.  
US GDP rose by 50% in real terms between 1908 and 1923. It is plausible to imagine 
that demand for automobiles would have risen 50% over this period were automobile prices 
to have remained at their 1908 level. This implies that 94,000 cars would have been bought at 
a price of $2126 in 1908, under schedule D 1. Although this quantity is 50% greater than the 
quantity actually bought, this growth is trivial compared with the expansion to 3.6 million 
that would occur in the following 15 years. D 1  and D turn out to be virtually 
indistinguishable, and arithmetically we find that a + b + c + d exceeds a + b + c by under 
1%, so that the ratio of consumer surplus to social savings remains at 51%, when expressed to 
the nearest integer. 
Broadberry et al find that GDP increased in Britain by 73% between 1784 and 1820. 
This implies that demand for cotton would have been 17.1m lbs in 1784 under 1820 demand 
conditions, but with price at its 1784 level. One sixth of the overall rise in actual demand 
between 1784 and 1820 can be accounted for not by the fall in prices, but by the rise in 
national income. Under this scenario the rise in consumer surplus becomes £13.5m in 1784 
terms, or 5% of GDP. Including area d increases the estimate of consumer surplus by about 
10%. The effect is larger in the case of cotton than cars because rising incomes account for a 
greater proportion of the rise in overall demand. 
 
Taking into account the shape of the demand curve 
 
Until now we have assumed that demand curve for cotton and cars are linear. This is 
computationally easy, but has no theoretical or empirical underpinnings. Even were we to 
know only the pre- and post- innovation equilibria we could estimate consumer surplus using 
alternative functional forms. In this case, however, we observe annual price and quantity 
equilibria, which we can use to ascertain the shape of the demand curve. In each case the 
curve that we estimate will be equivalent to D in Craft’s diagram, and we make a subsequent 







The markers in figure 2 represent the actual price/quantity equilibria that we observe 
in the data. All except two are joined by a line which we take to be the correct representation 
of the schedule D in the stylised figure presented by Crafts. Where the line does not directly 
join up two equilibria it is shown as a dashed line. Below the dashed line lies the observation 
for 1921, when fewer cars were sold than we would expect given the price prevailing in that 
year. 1921 was of course a year of severe depression, and it is reasonable to imagine that this 
observation will lie below the overall equilibrium demand schedule. In addition, the 
observation for 1916 lies above the expected line – more cars were sold than expected, given 
the price. The error is not large, however, as is best treated as a deviation of the sort that 
social scientists encounter from time to time.  
Figure 2 shows that the demand curve for cars in the US was not linear, but instead 
highly convex. It is possible to calculate the consumer surplus from the line given in figure 2, 
including the dashed section, arithmetically, simply by assuming that the demand curve is a 
straight line between the individual points on the graph, and calculating the area accordingly. 
When we do this, we find that the consumer surplus amounts to $798m in 1908 terms, which 
is $1.5bn in 1923 terms, or 1.8% of 1923 GDP. This is approximately one-eighth the size of 
the social savings estimate, and much smaller than the stylised representation of consumer 
surplus given in figure 1. Figure 2 estimates D rather than D1, but we have shown that D and 
D1 differ only trivially.  
      Figure 3 shows that the price and quantity observations for cotton do not naturally form as 
smooth a line as in the equilibrium points for the US car market. We therefore estimate the 
relationship, using a simple 1/x function. The estimated equation is clearly a reasonable fit, 
and takes the form Q = 10.2 + 1209/margin, with t-statistics of 2.2 and 11.4 on the constant 
and margin terms respectively. The adjusted R
2 is 0.78.   
We can calculate consumer surplus by integrating the demand curve with respect to 
the cost of processing cotton and evaluating it between the margin values for 1784 (107.2d) 
and 1820 (12.6d) respectively. The result is that the consumer surplus caused by the fall in 
prices is estimated to be £14.8m in 1784 terms, which is 5.5% of GDP. This is an estimate for 
the area under the curve D in Crafts’ diagram, and since we found earlier that the area under 




cotton prices as estimated by this method is around 6% of UK GDP, including benefits to 





There are two analytically distinct measures of welfare gains: compensating variation and 
equivalent variation. Both rely on comparing two imaginary situations: In the first situation, 
people cannot buy a particular good; in the other, they can. Effectively, we assume a price of 
infinity in the state of the world where the good is not accessible. Compensating variation 
(CV) measures the decline in income (l) a consumer is willing to accept just to keep access 
to a new good. We write: 
 




where  ) , ( t t p y W  maps incomes and prices into utility.  
Equivalent variation (EV) measures the increase in income required to give a consumer who 
does not have access to a particular good the same utility as a consumer with access:  
) , ( ) , ) 1 (( 2 2 2 p y W y W EV = ¥ +l  
(3) 
For consumers with quasi-linear preferences, the results for EV and CV are identical. 
Compensating and equivalent variation cannot be estimated simply by knowing initial and 
final prices and quantities. A useful short-cut for obtaining values of CV was proposed by 
Hausman (1999). He suggests triangulating the area under the demand curve, with a simple 
tangent (hyperplane in the multivariate case) through the point of current consumption. This 
implies that the compensating variation, expressed as a proportion of consumers’ expenditure 
can be approximated as follows: 
1
2
1 - » h S CV   (4) 
where S is the budget share of spending on the new good, and h is the price elasticity of 
demand.  
                                                                 
2 Again, Harley does likewise but makes the same analytical error as outlined earlier. In this case his estimate 




To apply the Hausman short-cut, we need estimates of the price elasticity of demand 
h for the budget share of the new good. Typically, estimating h is complicated by the fact 
that we only observe the intersection of demand and supply curves – we cannot identify the 
effect of price changes on consumption without a good instrument. In this case, however, we 
have already demonstrated in figures 2 and 3 that we can calculate the effect of a fall in price 
on consumption.  
In the case of cars we can estimate h by OLS, which gives a coefficient of  -1.67 
(estimated on a log-log basis). Table 1 sets out the calculation of consumer surplus in this 
case.  
         The convexity of the demand curve implies that the consumer surplus from introducing cars 
was relatively small for any given budget share. Since budget shares were also relatively low, 
the overall increase in consumer welfare was also relatively limited, at around 1% of GDP. 
The price elasticity of demand was not sufficiently low to create windfalls that are large 
relative to the budget shares of the automobile industry. However, the greater the convexity 
of the demand curve, the less accurate the triangulation method by Hausman becomes, and 
this means that we have to be careful in using this method in this case.  
Results for cotton spinning show a similar pattern. We again estimate the price 
elasticity of demand from a double-log specification. This gives a figure of  -0.94, which 
implies that cotton goods were more “essential” to the British in the 18
th and 19
th century than 
cars were to Americans in the 20
th. The lower elasticity is plausible. 
        Again, since aggregate demand even in the absence of price changes would have grown over 
this period, we need to add around 10% to cover the difference between D0 and D1 in Crafts’ 
diagram. It is best to see the Hausman method as suggesting that cotton goods generated 






A different way of estimating the consumer surplus for new goods was pioneered by 
Greenwood and Kopecky (2010). They effectively use a combination of estimation and 
calibration to derive a precise measure of the gain in consumer surplus, estimating the shape 
of the demand curve. In particular, it takes full account of the fact that demand curve will 
shift as incomes change. They employ a shifted utility function so that the marginal value of 
the first unit of a new good is bounded. This allows the calculation of welfare gains. The 
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Here, 1/r is intertemporal elasticity of substitution. For the new good, the first unit yields 
utility n
-r. This maps into a threshold price  ˆ p when utility is low enough for the new good to 
be just adopted by one unit. Greenwood and Kopecky assume that the consumer maximizes 
overall utility:  
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with 0 < q < 1; c, n ‡0; and subject to the budget constraint c+pn=y  
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q gives the weight in terms of utility for the old good, and (1-q) the utility weight of the new 
good, c serves as a numeraire, p is the relative price of new goods, and y is income. 
Next, the Greenwood and Kopecky method performs a calibration of n, q, and r to 
minimize the sum of squares of differences between observed new goods,  n, and the 
predicted new goods,  ˆ n.
3 To this end, we require data on income y, prices p and new good 
consumption n.  
                                                                 
3 As in Greenwood and Kopecky, we constrain consumption in the beginning of the period to zero. Due to the 
nonconvex nature of the equation 8, a Nelder-Mead nonlinear optimization algorithm is used for the sum of 




To apply the Hausman short-cut, we need estimates of the price elasticity of demand 
h for the budget share of the new good. Typically, estimating h is complicated by the fact 
that we only observe the intersection of demand and supply curves – we cannot identify the 
effect of price changes on consumption without a good instrument. In this case, however, we 
have already demonstrated in figures 2 and 3 that we can calculate the effect of a fall in price 
on consumption.  
In the case of cars we can estimate h by OLS, which gives a coefficient of  -1.67 
(estimated on a log-log basis). Table 1 sets out the calculation of consumer surplus in this 
case.  
         The convexity of the demand curve implies that the consumer surplus from introducing cars 
was relatively small for any given budget share. Since budget shares were also relatively low, 
the overall increase in consumer welfare was also relatively limited, at around 1% of GDP. 
The price elasticity of demand was not sufficiently low to create windfalls that are large 
relative to the budget shares of the automobile industry. However, the greater the convexity 
of the demand curve, the less accurate the triangulation method by Hausman becomes, and 
this means that we have to be careful in using this method in this case.  
Results for cotton spinning show a similar pattern. We again estimate the price 
elasticity of demand from a double-log specification. This gives a figure of  -0.94, which 
implies that cotton goods were more “essential” to the British in the 18
th and 19
th century than 
cars were to Americans in the 20
th. The lower elasticity is plausible. 
        Again, since aggregate demand even in the absence of price changes would have grown over 
this period, we need to add around 10% to cover the difference between D0 and D1 in Crafts’ 
diagram. It is best to see the Hausman method as suggesting that cotton goods generated 







 Greenwood and Kopecky method
We obtain a reasonable fit, as indicated by an R2 of 0.72 overall. The shift parameter of 
n=2.05 implies that the first units of cotton goods in our series have a value of 84 (in unit-free 
utility), twice as high as the value for cars. Our estimate of the budget share is clearly off, 
since the q returned by our calibration/estimation exercise suggests that there are virtually no 
purchases of cotton goods, while the actual budget share was anything but small. As a result, 
the Greenwood-Kopecky method suggests relatively small gains in consumer welfare, of 1.3-
1.7% of consumer expenditure. This figure is somewhat lower  –  but not categorically 
different from – the estimates obtained by the Hausman method.  
 
 
4.  Discussion:  
 
4.1 What were these process innovations worth to society? 
 
This paper has constructed social saving and consumer surplus estimates for two of the most 
important process innovations in the last two centuries. The results are given in table 5. 
 
 We find very considerable social savings for both cotton and car production  –  far 
greater in magnitude than found by Fogel or Fishlow for the railways. At the same time, the 
consumer surplus created by the introduction of process innovations is an order of magnitude 
smaller. Furthermore, there are considerable differences between the different methods of 
assessing consumer surplus. What is clear is that, as we would expect, linear approximations 
are very poor methods to estimate consumer surplus: knowing the elasticity of demand is 
critical in accurately assessing consumer surplus.  
Of the remaining methods, all are of the same order of magnitude, supporting their 
use in each case. The Greenwood-Kopecky method is more ‘precise’ than the Hausman 
method, in the sense that it allows us to approximate the area under the demand curve even if 
it is non-linear. The Hausman method, by comparison, is more crude, and uses a linear 
approximation that will almost always result in a lower bound of the true effect. The 
Greenwood-Kopecky method struggled somewhat with predicting consumer expenditure, 




as having generated consumer surplus of a little under 2%, and the invention of better 
methods to spin raw cotton as having generated consumer surplus for British consumers of a 
little over 2%, with an additional gain of the same order of magnitude for foreign consumers 
of British cotton goods.  
 
4.2 The relationship between consumer surplus and social savings 
 
Theory pins down a precise relationship between these two concepts. As Leunig 
(2010) shows, the following mapping should hold: 
DCS/SS= [(P0/P1)
e+1-1]/[(e+1)((P0/P1)-1]               (9) 
Where e is the price elasticity of demand, and other notation as above 
The difference between social savings and consumer surplus therefore depends on 
two factors – the extent of the price fall, and the price elasticity of demand. To see the 
intuition for this, it helps to think of the post-introduction decline in price as a “bribe” to get 
consumers to take up the good. If a large bribe is necessary to induce consumption then the 
product was not worth its original price to many people. The extent to which extra 
consumption of the new good was ‘bought’ by lower prices is measured by the price 
elasticity of demand.  
  Following Leunig (2010) we can plot the ratio of the change in consumer surplus and 
social savings given in equation nine graphically, to give that ratio as a function of the fall in 
price and elasticity of demand. We do this in figure 6, which shows the ratio between these 
two measures when the elasticity is 1.67 and 0.94, the elasticities for cars and cotton 
respectively.  
            The ratios of old to new prices were 6.7 and 8.5 for cars and cotton respectively, which, given 
the estimated elasticities, implies that the rises in consumer surpluses caused by the process 
innovations will be 0.30 and 0.19 respectively. These points are marked on figure 6. Our 
estimates for social savings are 14.7% and 17.6% respectively, implying gains in consumer 
surplus of 2.8% and 5.4% for cars and cotton (2.3% for cotton consumed in the United 
Kingdom). All of these figures are in line with direct estimates for consumer surplus, again, 




5.  Conclusion 
 
In this paper we attempt to stand on the shoulders of two of the giants of Cliometrics: Robert 
Fogel and Albert Fishlow. Until now the social savings method has almost exclusively been 
applied to railways. At the same time, many other big improvements in technology took place 
in the past. In this paper, we shift the emphasis from product innovations and look instead at 
process innovations. This is an important contribution to the social savings literature. We 
argue that the social savings methodology is better suited to evaluating process innovations 
than product innovations, for two reasons. First, the product produced is often pretty much 
identical before and after the process innovation. Cotton yarn spun on a ring, a mule, a water 
frame or a jenny was much the same product. We can therefore escape much of the debate 
about the extent to which, for example, a canal is a good substitute for a railway. Second, 
process innovations are (sometimes) adopted rapidly. Henry Ford was not able to introduce 
mass production overnight, but it took only a year for the moving assembly line to be fully 
introduced for the main chassis, and mass production covered the bulk of the total assembly 
process within less than a decade. When the time frame is compressed like this, the external 
before and after conditions are much more aligned, allowing for a cleaner comparison.  
  We find that the process innovations that made cotton and cars cheaper generated 
very large social savings estimates. We can get a sense of this by comparing them with a 
range of railway social savings estimates in different places and times. These are given in 
table 6.  
           In the context of table 6 the social saving estimates for improvements in producing cars 
(14.7% of GDP) and cotton (17.6% of GDP) are large. Only railways in Argentina and 
Mexico had noticeably bigger social savings results. Process innovations can be hugely 
important. 
Social savings and consumer surplus are, as we argued in the introduction, closely 
related concepts. Our findings suggest that in the cases studied here, social savings were at 
least one order of magnitude larger than consumer surpluses created by them. That said, the 




comparison with the consumer surplus estimates for many of the new goods that have been 
studied. The details are given in table 7.  
Improvements in the ability to manufacture cars and to convert raw cotton into cotton 
yarn generated additional consumer surplus greater than that from mobile phones, and of a 
similar order of magnitude to the creation of the internet, or the expansion of foreign trade. 
Only the arrival of sugar, tea and coffee, goods that must have been unbelievably novel, had 
materially larger welfare effects. 
  This paper has shown that, whether measured by social savings or consumer surplus, 
process innovations can have large effects for welfare and productivity, comparable in size 
with those of “big inventions” – the railway, the mobile phone and the internet. History has 
seen important welfare gains from improvements in how we produce goods, as well as from 
new products themselves. 
 




Table 1: Hausman method of assessing consumer surplus: cars 
 
Year  Expenditure   
on cars               
total 
expenditure      
budget 
share 
elasticity  CV 
1908  0.14  20  0.5%  -1.67  0.2% 
1923  2.2  56.9  3.9%  -1.67  1.15% 
1929  2.79  69.1  4.0%  -1.67  1.2% 




Table 2: Hausman method of assessing consumer surplus: cotton. 
 




share  elasticity  CV 
1784  5  103  4.9%  -0.94  2.6% 
1820  6.3  178  3.5%  -0.94  1.9% 
Figures are in 1784 £m. 
 
 
Table 3: Welfare results for Cars, Greenwood-Kopecky method, 1909-1929 
 
Sumerr  0.78 
EV  0.036 
CV  0.035 
n  0.002 
r  0.56 
q  0.89 
R2  0.95 
 
 
Table 4: Greenwood-Kopecky results for cotton, 1769-1810 
 
Sumerr  10.28 
EV  0.013 
CV  0.017 
n  2.05 
r  -6.36 
q  1 





Table 5: The benefits of process innovation as a % of GDP 
 
     Cars   Cotton   (Cotton:  domestic  only) 
Social  Savings     14.7   17.6   7.5 
Consumer  surplus:     
linear  a+b+c        7.5     4.5   
linear  a+b+c+d      7.5     5.0 
area under plotted line      1.8     6.1    2.6 
Hausman        1.2     2.5 
Greenwood-Kopecky       3.5     1.5 




Table 6: Railway social saving estimates 
    Freight   Passengers 
Argentina 1913     26.0 
England and Wales 1865       4.1     2.5 
England and Wales 1890   10.2    6.4 
USA 1859           3.7  
USA 1890           4.7     2.6 
Spain 1878           6.5  
Spain 1912       18.5 
Russia 1907          4.6     1.0 
India 1900           9.0  
Brazil  1913      18.0   1.6 
Mexico 1895      14.6 
Mexico  1910      31.5   0.6 
Sources: Freight:  Argentina and Brazil: Summerhill (2003); England and Wales: 1865: 
Hawke (1970), 1890: Foreman-Peck (1991); USA: 1859: Fishlow (1965), 1890: Fogel 
(1964); Russia: Metzer (1976); India: Hurd (1983); Spain: Gomez-Mendoza (1983); Mexico: 
Coatsworth (1981). Passengers: England and Wales: Leunig (2006); USA: Boyd and Walton 





Table 7: Welfare gains from new goods and processes 
 
  Good  Consumer Surplus  Study 
This study  Assembly 
line/cars 
1.2-3.5%   
  Cotton spinning  5.4-6.1%   (1.5%-2.6% for UK consumed cotton) 
Other studies  Sugar, Tea, 
Coffee 
8-17%  Hersh and Voth 2010 
  Internet  2-3%  Goulsbee and Klenow 
2006 
  Mobile phones  0.5-0.9%  Hausman 2006 

































Figure 3: Cotton processing costs and sales, 1784-1820 
 
 

















The relationship between cotton 




Figure 5: Greenwood-Kopecky estimation of cotton consumption 
 
 
Figure 6: The ratio of the change in consumer surplus to social savings when the 
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Appendix: Prices and consumption of cars and cotton 
 
Cars    Cotton    Cotton 
  Q  P real      Q  P real      Q  P real 
1908  63.5  2126    1784  11.3  107.2    1803  52.3  36.5 
1909  123.9  1298    1785  18.0  104.7    1804  61.4  38.0 
1910  181  1150    1786  19.2  83.6    1805  58.9  23.7 
1911  199.3  1093    1787  22.2  90.8    1806  57.5  23.6 
1912  356  893    1788  19.6  67.4    1807  72.7  20.0 
1913  461.5  803    1789  32.3  69.6    1808  42.0  29.6 
1914  548.1  705    1790  30.6  71.8    1809  88.5  22.5 
1915  895.9  588    1791  28.3  73.7    1810  123.7  21.1 
1916  1525.5  506    1792  33.4  63.9    1811  89.0  21.4 
1917  1745.7  420    1793  17.9  39.0    1812  73.0  14.0 
1918  943.4  503    1794  23.0  47.0    1813  78.0  16.1 
1919  1651.6  426    1795  25.2  49.7    1814  74.0  15.0 
1920  1905.5  423    1796  31.4  44.0    1815  81.0  17.5 
1921  1468  352    1797  22.7  53.3    1816  89.0  13.9 
1922  2274.1  349    1798  31.3  37.0    1817  107.0  12.1 
1923  3624.7  317    1799  42.5  36.2    1818  110.0  14.1 
        1800  51.6  30.9    1819  109.0  10.3 
        1801  54.1  30.1    1820  120.0  12.6 
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